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The shadow-politics of
Wolofisation
Donal Cruise O’Brien*
The relationship between language and politics in the African post-
colony remains obscure and underexamined. Here we withdraw into a
poorly lit area, an area of potentialities, where new political shapes may
emerge as the outcome of half-conscious choices made by very large
numbers of people. Language choices in the first place: the expansion
of the Wolof language in Senegal, principally though far from
exclusively an urban phenomenon, is to be seen in a context where the
individual may speak several languages, switching linguistically from
one social situation to another. Such multilingualism is general in
Africa:" the particularity of the Wolof case, at least in Senegal, is the
extent to which this language has spread, far beyond the boundaries of
core ethnicity, of a historical Wolof zone from the colonial or pre-
colonial periods. And these individual language choices cast their
political shadow.
The political consequences of this socio-linguistic phenomenon are as
yet indistinct, but to see a little more clearly one should in the second
place relate it to the subject of the politics of ethnicity. Language is of
course an important element in any definition of ethnicity, and there is
an evident overlap; but the politics of language is also a distinguishable
subject in its own right. Where the assertion of ethnic identity can be
identified as a possible weapon in the individual’s struggle for power
and recognition within the colonial and post-colonial state,# the choice
of a language is that of the most effective code in the individual’s daily
struggle for survival. Language choice in such a setting may be less a
matter of assertion, the proud proclamation of an identity, than it is one
of evasion, a more or less conscious blurring of the boundaries of
identity. And in Senegal the government itself by its inaction has
practised its own shadow-politics of procrastination.
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" D. Laitin, Language Repertoires and State Construction in Africa (Cambridge, 1992). My own
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The choice of a language also has significant implications in terms of
culture: to choose to speak Wolof, most of the time, is to enter a
distinguishable area, if not of sharply defined ethnicity then often of a
particular style of religiously styled interaction, in the accommoda-
tionist tradition of Senegal’s Sufi brotherhoods. The different elements
within that Sufi tradition, brotherhoods or segments, have enough of
mutual recognition, within a shared Islamic identity, to amount to a
single cultural group. It is possible, then, to envisage the future
emergence, from the expansion of a particular language and culture
group, of a more viable nationhood within the territorial frontiers of the
Senegalese state. Such is the benign political potential of linguistic
Wolofisation.
But of course one must tread very carefully here. In the first place
one must recognise that the choice of (principal) language need be
determinant neither of ethnicity nor of nationality. A benign language
scenario, the painless emergence of nationhood from a shared language
choice, must confront for example the tragic example of Rwanda,
where Hutus and Tutsis speak the same language, Kinyarwanda, with
a common culture within which took place the 1994 genocide.$ The use
of a single language has never constrained the ethnic strife between
Protestants and Catholics in Ulster. Perhaps the political problems
arise, as with the rival clans of Somalia, when you do all too clearly
understand what the other side is saying – less speculatively one may
simply note that a shared language doesn’t necessarily help in getting
on together.
To clear away at least some of the mists, then, it may be useful to
suggest some of the most important themes in African language politics,
each relevant to the case of Wolofisation. A first obvious theme is that
of the position of European languages as privileged languages of the
post-colony: the role of these languages in the maintenance of juridical
statehood and also in the maintenance of the advantages of a
linguistically qualified e! lite. A second theme is that of the political use
of various African languages, for example in the patrimonial politics
studied by William Reno in Sierra Leone.% A third theme is that of the
potential for use of particular African languages as formal and written
$ See G. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis. History of a genocide, – (London, 1995).
% W. Reno, Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone (Cambridge, 1995). One might also bear
in mind Emmanuel Terray’s distinction between the politics of the ‘air conditioner ’ and that of
‘ the verandah’ in Co# te d’Ivoire. The distributionist politics of the verandah here involve many
other languages besides the official French of the air conditioner. See E. Terray, ‘Le climatiseur
et la ve! randa’, in Collectif, Afrique Plurielle, Afrique Actuelle (Hommages a' Georges Balandier)
(Paris, 1986).
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languages of state. The leading candidates for such recognition are
languages which have had a trans-ethnic commercial function
(Lingala, Swahili, etc.) : but to convert the lingua franca of trade into a
privileged language of state requires the intervention of a determined
political leadership, which is likely also to encounter some determined
political resistance. The question of a national language, one to be
drawn from the African repertoire, at the expense of others to be
ignored or excluded by the state, is an explosive one in any multilingual
and multiethnic state, and thus most states in Africa. There may be
very good political reasons, perhaps even that of the survival of the
state, to fall back on the European language of colonial inheritance.
The fourth theme in African language politics, then, is that of the
already mentioned relationship between language and the politics of
ethnicity: how far does language difference contribute to ethnic
conflict? The relation of each of these four general themes to the subject
of the politics of Wolofisation should become apparent below.
To take the question of a Wolof ethnicity first, one immediately
confronts substantial ambiguity in terms of the politics of identity.
Informants often find it difficult to specify either in general terms who
can be identified as a Wolof, or even whether they themselves should
be categorised as Wolof.& Wolof identification is perhaps best seen as a
process, one which relates to a range of subjects : urbanisation,
migration, religion, statehood. There are no fixed ethnic boundaries
here, no lines of battle drawn up by colonial experience, on the whole
no primordialism, rather what may be (for the state) a helpful
ambiguity and flux. In so far as it is language use which defines the
terms of ethnic membership, then the ethnic boundaries are blurred, in
part by the plurilingual reality of Senegalese life. David Laitin sees such
plurilingualism as characteristic of Africa, where one should think in
terms of language repertoires rather than single language identities :
thus it is ‘ language chauvanism’ which is unusual in Africa.' This
blurring of language boundaries in Africa, and the relatively non-
antagonistic character of language divisions, may then in part be
explained by the absence of obvious political issues in terms of which
lines of confrontation might be drawn. Thus there are no reserved
government jobs for the speakers of particular Senegalese languages, in
& See L. Villalon, Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal (Cambridge, 1995), p. 49.
' Laitin, Language Repertoires and State Construction, p. 157 ; ‘Language chauvinism’ may be
unusual in Africa, but it is not unknown. The governmental imposition of Amharic in Ethiopia
until 1991 is thus analysed by Mekuria Bulcha, in ‘The politics of linguistic homogenization in
Ethiopia and the conflict over afaan Oromoo ’, African Affairs, 96, 384 (1997), 325–52.
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contrast for example with the Indian cases reviewed by Joyotirindra
Das Gupta.( While ethnic and familial favouritism does help in getting
government jobs, in Senegal as elsewhere in the world, the preference
in Senegal as elsewhere in Africa is seldom put in language terms.
Yet politics, from another perspective, is also clearly involved here,
in the socio-linguistic process of Wolofisation, for it can be argued that
Wolof speakers provide what could be termed a ‘core ethnicity’ for the
Senegalese state, rather as do the English for the United Kingdom (or
‘Britain’) in the view of A. D. Smith.) Those are rather the terms in
which the Wolof (speakers) tend to see the subject, in so far as they
trouble to think about it ; as with the English until recent times, part of
their advantage is that they haven’t had to think about the subject
much. Somewhere in the background, however, there lurks an
assumption, that without the Wolof there would be no Senegal, that
this is the irreducible core of the state. Members of the country’s other
ethnic groups of course see the subject rather differently, often with
some degree of resentment of Wolof advantages within the state, either
indeed in terms of government jobs or of the state’s allocation of
resources. At the limit there are some in Casamance who would prefer
not to be part of the Senegalese state, and many more in the south who
resent the ‘Wolof colonialism’ of state bureaucracy.
Could Wolof become the official language of the Senegalese state?
With such a question we enter the zone of symbolic confrontation, a
confrontation in the first instance with French. That question is
implicit in the attempt to promote literacy in the Wolof language, then
to be used in state education and in government documentation. The
present situation is that Wolof is primarily an oral medium, while
French dominates in all state education or documentation. The
proponents of Wolof literacy (in Roman script) have thus thought of
themselves primarily as contesting the post-colonial hegemony of the
French language in Senegal, as agents of an African cultural liberation
from the post-colonial French. Such a liberation was to be achieved by
official recognition and promotion of the Wolof language, first, in state
education. Enthusiasm in this cause reached its high point (to date)
over the years from 1967 to 1971, concentrated around the University
of Dakar. The ideas are still around in 1997, evoked with a little
nostalgia now, but there has been remarkably little government effort
( J. Das Gupta, ‘Ethnicity, language demands and national development in India’, in N.
Glazer and D. P. Moynihan (eds.), Ethnicity: theory and experience (Cambridge, MA, 1975),
pp. 466–88. ) A. D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford, 1986), pp. 153–73.
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to pursue any promotion of Wolof literacy in the meantime. Part of the
explanation for the governmental inertia lies in the nagging problem of
the relation between Wolof and the other languages of Senegal : can
one local language be the privileged instrument of national cultural
liberation, not to speak of African authenticity, without provoking
unwelcome reactions from other local language communities?
Leaving such a question to one side for the moment, it is to be
remarked that a long-term process of Wolofisation continues to
operate, quite independently of government language policy. Wolof
has continued to spread as a spoken language, a lingua franca of
commercial contact and of urbanisation, consistently since French
conquest in the late nineteenth century. While membership of the
Wolof ethnie has indeed expanded over this period (the Wolof as 30 per
cent of the Senegalese population in 1900, 36 per cent in 1970, 44 per
cent in 1988),* use of the Wolof language has expanded much further,
far beyond the (fuzzy) boundaries of ethnic self-recognition. Wolof is
furthermore exceptional in this respect : the first remotely reliable
statistics on language use in Senegal (1963–4) suggested that as many
as four-fiths of the national population spoke Wolof in the home either
as first language (41 per cent) or second language (39 per cent)."! Leigh
Swigart in 1992 found Wolof to be spoken as first or second language
by 71 per cent of Senegalese, although only 44 per cent were of Wolof
ethnic background. She also found that such a language overlap from
ethnicity was very much greater for Wolof than for the country’s other
languages : ‘ the Pulaar, Mandingo and Diola languages are also spoken
by a sector of the population not ethnically of those backgrounds, (but)
the discrepancy in those cases is at most a few per cent.’ Serer on the
other hand follows an Irish pattern, in that ‘ the Serer language is
spoken by fewer people than claim Serer as their ethnicity’."" Many of
* See tables for ethnic membership and language use (Senegal and Fatick) in Villalon, Islamic
Society and State Power in Senegal, pp. 48–50, 53.
"! See F. Wioland, ‘Enque# te sur les langues parle! es au Se!ne! gal par les e! le' ves de l’enseignement
primaire : e! tude statistique’, Dakar: Centre de Linguistique Applique! e de Dakar, 1965. The main
findings of this survey, of languages spoken by primary schoolchildren (and their parents) in
1963–4, were also provided in a much shorter, undated pamphlet, ‘L’expansion du Wolof au
Se!ne! gal ’, Dakar: CLAD, n.d. This 1963–4 survey covered 360 state primary schools from all the
regions of Senegal – 35,434 pupils. The questionnaire distributed in the schools asked, for each
pupil, mother’s language, father’s language, first language spoken in the home, other languages
spoken by the pupil ; see also Francine Kane, ‘Sociologie des langues au Se!ne! gal ’, The' se de
Doctorat, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris, 1974, and D. B. Cruise O’Brien, ‘L’enjeu
politique de la Wolofisation’, in Centre d’Etude d’Afrique Noire de Bordeaux, AnneU e Africaine
1979, Paris : Pedone, pp. 319–35.
"" L. Swigart, ‘Practice and perception: language use and attitudes in Dakar’, Ph.D. Thesis
(Anthropology), University of Washington, 1992, p. 80.
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the Serer, in effect, through their language use seem to be engaged in
a process of (ethnic) Wolofisation.
Those who speak no Wolof are in a culturally marginal position in
Senegal today, and the process of linguistic Wolofisation could provide
a cultural basis for a Senegalese national community, although possible
future political problems are lurking in the shadows. Here at least in
principle could be a bridge across the cultural gap between the rulers
and the ruled, as the Wolof language can provide a shared medium for
the great majority of the state’s citizens, thus suggesting itself as
instrument in the (hypothetical) hegemonic quest outlined by J. F.
Bayart for African states."# The fact that the rulers in this case have
shown so little interest in building or using such a cultural bridge does
then suggest that other political priorities are involved. Those in
government seek to preserve their control above all through the
administrative use of the post-colonial language, French: it is French
which provides the tested and still preferred medium for the
strengthening of ties within the e! lite, between persons of a range of
ethnic and linguistic origins. This is the sort of process which Bayart has
termed the ‘reciprocal assimilation of e! lites ’,"$ tending to the
construction less of a nation than of a ruling class. The post-colonial
language then becomes a means through which the dominant can
restrict popular access to the top through a process of e! lite closure,"%
first, through the best educational institutions. It is true in Senegal as
elsewhere in Africa that the rulers are much more concerned with the
construction of states than of nations. The particularity of Senegal may
then lie in the fact that something like a nation is none the less being
constructed, from below.
The conquering language here, the Wolof spreading across the
territory of Senegal, is a hybrid language in the process of creation, the
‘Urban Wolof ’ identified in Swigart’s recent Dakar based study: ‘ the
use of Urban Wolof is the Senegalese urbanites’ way of expressing their
identity as both the inheritors of a colonial legacy and the creators of
a new urban culture and language’."& To be linguistically pure in such
a context is to be out of touch; urban Wolof is a language first of mixing
between French and Wolof : ‘To hear urban Wolof is to hear two
"# Bayart, The State in Africa, ‘Part Two: Scenarios in the pursuit of hegemony’, pp. 119–204.
"$ Ibid., pp. 150–79.
"% C. Myers-Scotton, ‘Elite closure as boundary maintenance: the case of Africa’, in B.
Weinstein (ed.), Language Policy and Political Development (Norwood, NY, 1990).
"& Swigart, ‘Practice and perception’, p. 280. See also P. Dumont, Le français et les langues parleU es
au SeUneUgal (Paris, 1983).
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languages merging to create a single, highly expressive code.’"' An
excessive use of French on the one hand condemns the speaker as ‘an
assimileU , a perhaps too willing victim of the French civilising mission’,
while on the other hand the user of ‘a Wolof considered too pure’ may
be ‘categorised as a kawkaw or hick’."( The townies teach this new code
to their country cousins, and those really in the know add English
words to their lexicon, as is ‘ the trade mark of young men… les jeunes
bandits de Dakar ’.")
The French language thus retreats, especially as a spoken medium,
a retreat at least in part to be explained by considerations of political
economy. Economic decline in Senegal, structural adjustment since
1981 (although half-heartedly applied) has involved at least a partial
retreat of the state, with the closing of many parastatals and the
freezing of most governmental hiring."* Not much incentive then for
the young to cultivate their French, the language of inaccessible
officaldom: the language of material survival, in a Senegalese urban
context, is the language of the informal or parallel or real economy, not
French but Urban Wolof. These are difficult economic circumstances,
to be sure, although not as forbidding as in many African states : we are
at some distance yet from the threat of state collapse.
A relatively benign language scenario in Senegal, if it is to be set
against the background of a faltering economy, has allowed the
scarcely contested spread of the hybridised Wolof language to a
dominant position in the speech of all urban centres. The lack of
substantial contest from the speakers of Senegal’s other languages has
in part depended upon their being few evident stakes at issue. Six
languages are officially ‘recognised’ in Senegal (Wolof, Serer,
Mandinka, Pulaar, Diola, Soninke), but these are in effect ignored
both in education and in government documentation. Such a situation
as already indicated is to be contrasted with the more fractious cultural
politics of India, where ‘ language demands have been concerned with
many issues…the official language of the federal government; the
reorganisation of the federation along regional linguistic lines ; the
official languages of the states of the federation; and language policies
relating to education, public employment, and general communi-
"' L. Swigart, ‘Cultural Creolisation and language use in post-colonial Africa: the case of
Senegal ’, in Africa 64, 2 (1994), 176. "( Ibid., 179–80.
") Ibid., 181 ; see also Mamadou Ndiaye, ‘Le Wolofanglais : interlect des teenagers des villes du
Se!ne! gal ’, paper to West African Research Association, Conference on ‘West Africa and the Global
Challenge’, Dakar, 22–28 June 1997, Session ‘Langues et Socie! te! s du Sahel ’, 25 June 1997.
"* For a bleak enough assessment see G. Durufle! , Le SeUneUgal peut-il sortir de la crise? (Paris, 1994).
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caton’.#! These language demands furthermore are articulated by
language leaders, who have been active in creating ethnic consciousness
based on language loyalty. At the state level, under India’s federal
structure, it is argued that ‘ integral ethnicity rather than ethnic
pluralism appears to provide the dominant premise of language
demands and language politics ’.#" These are the politics of linguistic
closure, of the reservation of employment opportunities, which in turn
create the problem of language minorities, thus raising ‘problems of
inter-state adjustment that are often difficult to solve’.##
While India’s cultural and linguistic politics are played out on an
altogether different institutional scale, and in a very different cultural
setting, they may be instructively compared with our case of the politics
of Wolofisation. There is no question yet of the reservation of jobs to the
speakers of particular Senegalese languages, rather a common
subordination of all these languages to the still hegemonic French, in all
formal sector employment. Language battles are yet to be fought out
on the street, or indeed to be staged in the courts as in the USA since
1964.#$ Yet in Senegal one does begin to see a role for aspirant language
leaders, of the Wolofisation movement from the mid 1960s, of a
Halpulaaren movement from the 1980s. Pulaar is the second most
widely spoken language in Senegal, spoken by two groups previously
seen as ethnically separate, the Peul and the Toucouleur, which the
Halpulaaren movement aimed to unite under a single language banner
– ‘partly a response to the threat posed by Wolofization’.#% A linguistic
confrontation in the Senegalese National Assembly in the 1980s showed
perhaps some of the future possibilities, when a speaker from one of the
small opposition parties (the People’s Liberation Party) spoke in
Wolof. French is the real language of the Assembly, and this speaker
wanted to make his symbolic point, on behalf of the Wolof language.
He was answered by a government minister in Pulaar, a language
which the previous speaker did not understand, making another point,
that ‘Wolof was not the only indigenous language alternative ’.#& So
there are some good reasons to carry on talking in French, at least in
the National Assembly.
On the street, however, Wolof has increasingly prevailed over the
#! Das Gupta, ‘Ethnicity, language demands’, p. 479. #" Ibid., p. 482.
## Ibid., p. 485.
#$ L. H. Fuchs, The American Kaleidoscope. Race, ethnicity and the civic culture (Hanover and
London, 1990), especially ch. 24, ‘Respecting diversity, promoting unity: the language issue’,
pp. 458–73. #% Villalon, Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal, p. 51.
#& Swigart, ‘Practice and perception’, p. 268.
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past century, a language lead to be explained first in terms of the
impact of the colonial state. The French colony of Senegal was built
first on Wolof territory, towards the Atlantic littoral, and the major
colonial towns were sited among the Wolof-speaking. Those who
migrated to these towns from the interior almost automatically learned
Wolof, in St Louis, Dakar, Thie' s or Rufisque. And the ascendance of
Wolof as a language of commerce was then such that even a town such
as Kaolack, built on Serer territory, became predominantly Wolof-
speaking, while Ziguinchor in Casamance (among the Diola) had an
increasing Wolof presence. The colonial legacy to independent Senegal
has been one where the country’s principal towns are all predominantly
Wolof-speaking. Thus there has been a language lesson to be learned
by the ambitious migrant from the countryside, in Wolof. And it is
Urban Wolof, with its extensive borrowings from French, which has
taken the lead in independent Senegal.
Reviewing the language situation of independent Senegal down to
the present time, then, one may begin by thinking of Wolof in terms of
different language situations, of different contexts and purposes of
language use, with distinguishable political implications. The el-
ementary situations to be reviewed here are those of the language of the
home (first language) ; the language of commerce (lingua franca) ; the
(parallel) language of state. A national struggle for recognition as
language of civilisation is then to be appraised.
Language of the home
One starts here with the language of ethnic identification, which
according to the 1988 census put the Wolof at 43±7 per cent of Senegal’s
population, followed by the Halpulaaren at 23±3 per cent, the Serer at
14±8 per cent, the Diola at 5±5 per cent, the Manding at 4±6 per cent and
others at 8±2 per cent.#' The ethnic statistics of the census, however,
have understated the extent to which Wolof becomes the first language
of the home. This became clear from the first national survey of
language use in Senegal (1963–4), by the Centre de Linguistique
Applique! e de Dakar (CLAD), which found that where there was
intermarriage between Wolof and non-Wolof, the language chosen for
family communication was almost always Wolof, whether it was the
wife or husband who was of Wolof origin. Such mixed marriages
#' Ethnic census figures are provided in Villalon, Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal, p. 48.
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accounted for 16 per cent of the domestically Wolof-speaking total.#(
The Wolof language was furthermore alone in having this maritally
hegemonic status. Nor was intermarriage with a Wolof a necessary
condition for the adoption of the Wolof language in the home by those
of non-Wolof origin. The 1963–4 survey thus found that Wolof was
spoken as first domestic language in homes where neither husband nor
wife was of Wolof ethnic origin (another 15 per cent of the domestically
Wolof-speaking total).#) These proportions of Wolof-speakers beyond
the boundaries of ethnicity (roughly one-sixth of domestic Wolof-
speakers in ‘mixed marriages ’ with one Wolof partner, another one-
sixth with neither partner of Wolof origin) remained remarkably
constant across the entire territory of Senegal. Such findings amount to
an unpublicised referendum on the perceived utility of the Wolof
language in Senegal. The CLAD findings of 1963–4 are confirmed (on
a small scale) by Leonardo Villalon in his Fatick study of the late
1980s : in Fatick, originally a Serer town and now a regional capital,
not only do ‘all individuals of Wolof ethnicity speak Wolof, and the
vast majority of them speak only Wolof…For many [members of other
ethnic groups] Wolof is actually a first language, and particularly
among the smaller ethnic groups in Fatick, frequently the only one.’#*
Thus not only has the Wolof language been invading the Senegalese
home, where it has taken occupation in a significant number of cases,
it has been expanding the frontiers of the Wolof ethnie.
Language of commerce
Wolof is virtually indispensable to market trade in Senegal, as can be
demonstrated by a visit to any substantial market in that country,
necessary at least as a second language: 80 per cent of the CLAD survey
spoke Wolof as first or second language; 84 per cent of Villalon’s Fatick
survey. Swigart reports the view of ‘many linguists…that if one
includes persons having a passive understanding of the language, the
Wolophone figure would rise to near 90%’.$! It is the logic of the
market above all which drives the process of Wolofisation, linguistic
and then ethnic. As elsewhere in Africa, or in the world, the urban
commercial setting allows for shifting ethnic identification; in Senegal
the shift is above all to the Wolof benefit. One Wolof informant, himself
#( Centre de Linguistique Applique! e de Dakar, ‘L’Expansion du Wolof au Se!ne! gal ’, undated
pamphlet, p. 10. #) Ibid., p. 12.
#* Villalon, Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal, p. 51.
$! Swigart, ‘Practice and perception’, p. 80.
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of some Pulaar ancestry, meditated along these lines : ‘What is a Peul
(colonial ethnic category) anyway? A man who trails around after his
cows. And if he sits down and sells his cows, he becomes a Toucouleur
(another colonial census category, again Pulaar-speaking). Then if he
uses the money to go off to town and starts to buy and sell cloth, he
becomes a Wolof.’$"
Nor does one have to go to town to become a Wolof. Commercial
agriculture has also substantially contributed to the process of
Wolofisation, linguistic and then ethnic, as cultivation of Senegal’s
staple cash crop (the groundnut) was developed from colonial times
above all on Wolof territory. State investment followed, leaving the
Wolof with a lead in terms of communications infrastructure (rail and
road). Seasonal migration was then (from the First World War
onwards) attracted to the Wolof groundnut farms. Although this
migration has much diminished since 1970, with the relative decline of
the groundnut in the Senegalese economy, it has already had its
lasting effect in the diffusion of the Wolof language. The groundnut–
Wolof linkage was shown notably in a tendency for groundnut farmers
of Serer ethnic origin to adopt the Wolof language and (virtual or
complete) ethnic identity.
The tendency to the Wolofisation of the Serer, in terms of language
use and identity, may thus largely be explained as a product of the
market. A full explanation of that tendency also however requires
consideration of a cultural dimension, with the contribution of the
Mouride brotherhood to Serer Wolofisation. The Mouride founder
Amadu Bamba became in his own lifetime among other things a Wolof
folk hero, and Mouride leadership since his time (1851–1927) has
communicated with the followers almost exclusively in Wolof. Mouride
followers or talibeU s are automatically Wolof-speaking (and often enough
literate in Wolof, using Arabic characters). In the countryside the
brotherhood has made its most substantial ethnic advance among the
Serer : this may be seen as a ‘retribalisation’, involving the use of a Sufi
brotherhood in the interest of commercial survival, as with the
Nigerian Tijaniyya studied by Abner Cohen.$# Thus as a Tukulor
becomes a Wolof by going to town to sell cloth, so a Serer becomes a
Wolof by turning over his fields to groundnut farming or by looking to
Mouride saintly leadership.
$" Musings of Thierno Sow, Touba, March 1975.
$# A. Cohen, Custom and Politics in Urban Africa. A study of Hausa migrants in Yoruba towns (Berkeley
and Los Angeles, 1969).
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Parallel language of state
While French still remains the language of all official documentation in
Senegal, and French-language qualifications are essential for govern-
ment employment, the Wolof language is not excluded from the
corridors of state power. On the contrary, Wolof is the spoken medium
of bureaucracy (Urban Wolof) leaving, it is true, room for insistence on
correct French in the interests of e! lite closure when dealing with
troublesome supplicants. When the state officials talk among them-
selves, however, Urban Wolof tends to prevail (French as a ‘ they-
code’, Wolof as a ‘we-code’).$$ French is the language of authority and
of instruction, the language in which the orders are given. Wolof is the
language of collusion and of evasion, the language in which the orders
are most effectively circumvented.
A Wolof language lead in the corridors of state power can be traced
back to colonial times, with state recruitment among the ethnic Wolof
around the colonial capitals of St Louis and Dakar. Today the state
remains, as it has been over the intervening years, by far the biggest
employer in Senegal, although it is now economically hard pressed and
in partial retreat. It is logical enough, then, that Wolof should still be
popularly perceived as the spoken medium of career success, even if
success in securing state employment is remote from most people’s
reality.
Another official medium of communication, government radio, has
since Senegalese independence given added impetus to the process of
linguistic Wolofisation. The state broadcasting system, Office de
Radiodiffusion et Te! le! vision du Se!ne! gal (ORTS) operates on radio
principally in Wolof. Rita Cruise O’Brien in a 1975 study found that
56 per cent of radio broadcasting time on the Chaine Nationale was in
Wolof, against 28 per cent in French, and 5 per cent or less in other
Senegalese languages (5 per cent in Pulaar, 5 per cent in Serer, 3 per
cent in Diola, 2 per cent in Mandinka).$% Wolof rules, on the radio, and
the radio has a long reach, in Senegal as elsewhere in Africa. The 1988
census estimated that seven out of every ten Senegalese households
$$ Swigart, ‘Practice and perception’ p. 265 for ‘ they code’}‘we code’ distinction, comparing
with English and Spanish as used by Hispanics in the USA.
$% R. Cruise O’Brien, ‘Broadcasting for national development. The case of Senegal ’ (London:
International Broadcasting Institute, 1975) (Roneo). R. Cruise O’Brien, ‘Broadcasting pro-
fessionalism in Senegal ’ in F. Ugboajah (ed.), Mass Communication, Culture and Society in West Africa
(Oxford, 1985). Independent commercial radio, introduced in Dakar in the 1990s, furthers the
cause of Wolofisation. Advertisers prefer Urban Wolof, which reaches the largest audience. L.
Swigart, ‘Language and legitimacy in Senegalese advertising’, paper to Conference of West
African Research Association, Dakar, 25 June 1997.
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owned a radio, and that in Dakar over half the population listened to
the radio every day.$& It wouldn’t be much less even far away from the
capital city.
The principal radio broadcasters are themselves Wolof-speakers,
often using an improvised Wolof translation of French language texts
on the national radio. One broadcaster in 1975 self-consciously stated
his task in Wolof Radio-diffusion to be one of ‘nation-building’.$' But
then he knew that I was interested in political questions. It is probably
economic necessity, rather than considerations of high policy, which
dictates language choice on the radio, a very tight budget with means
to broadcast effectively in no more than one ‘national language’.
Many more listeners understand Wolof than any other language, so
that the priority accorded to Wolof on the radio is justified above all by
cost-effectiveness. However, the massive preponderance of Wolof on
the national radio is of course politically significant, first as an indicator
of what kind of ‘nation’ is at issue, second as an agency in assisting the
process of linguistic Wolofisation within the boundaries of the
Senegalese state.
State education provides another area within which Wolof has been
favoured by circumstances, although French remains the language of
instruction. Textbooks (such as are available) are in French, and the
teacher talks French in the schoolroom. But in the schoolyard, out of
class, Wolof again prevails – the preferred medium of communication
between children of various ethnic origins. To move Wolof from the
schoolyard to the schoolroom, however, to make it the preferred
medium of instruction, would be a hazardous venture, which appears
not to have tempted any Senegalese government since independence.
There are professional linguists and educators who point to the possible
advantages of Wolof language instruction for the furtherance of mass
literacy (only one quarter of the population – 26 per cent – was literate
in French according to the 1988 census), and a relatively ample
pedagogic documentation has been developed for the eventual teaching
of Wolof as a written language (very much more so for Wolof than for
any other Senegalese language). But in the first place, teaching through
Wolof is not a popular idea, with parents or teachers or those to be
taught, who all appear to share a fear of losing the possibilities which
$& Figures cited in F. Schaffer, ‘Demokaraasi in Africa. What Wolof political concepts teach us
about how to study democracy’, Ph.D. thesis, University of California at Berkeley (Political
Science) 1994, p. 109.
$' Doudou Diop in interview, Office de Radiodiffusion et Te! le! vision du Se!ne! gal, Dakar,
March 1975.
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the French language still holds. And there are, in the second place,
some good if unstated political reasons for governmental hesitancy on
this issue, of which more below. The government refuses to allow the
teaching of written Wolof on any more than a very timid, professedly
‘experimental ’ basis : perhaps these experiments are designed to fail,
but in any case the outcome remains that literate Wolof has yet been
taught in no more than a few state schools. The children or pupils at
the same time have been making their own language choices, as the
schoolyard furthers the cause of Wolofisation.
The progress of the Wolof language cannot, however, plausibly be
seen as moving along a line of battle, defeating the other Senegalese
languages in open cultural combat. The language choices involved, in
the marketplace, in the schoolyard, even in the corridors of
administration, have little explicit political content. There are,
however, considerations of status here, with implications for the
political future. Wolof-speakers tend to see themselves as culturally
advanced: they have a condescending term, lakakat, for one incapable
of understanding the Wolof language. a lakakat (literally ‘ speaker’) like
the Greek barbaros, is one who makes strange and unintelligible sounds:
the barbarian lakakat have only themselves to blame, in the Wolof view,
for they need only learn the Wolof language to join the civilised club.
There appears to be little enough of genealogical fastidiousness among
the Wolof, no conspicuous tendency for example to draw sharp
distinctions between the ‘real ’ ethnic Wolof (from the traditional
Wolof states, Kayor, Walo, Jolof, Baol and Saloum) and the growing
horde of linguistic newcomers, from all over the country. The form of
Wolof now spreading across Senegal is the Frenchified Dakar version,
Urban Wolof, in a process which might be seen as the hand-me-down
outcome of the French colonial policy of assimilation.
The barbarians will have their own views on this matter of cultural
ranking, however, a politics yet to emerge from the shadows. The facts
that spoken Wolofisation lacks official coordination, and that literate
Wolofisation is in effect impeded by state authority, have thus far
meant that there has been very little disposition to mobilise resistance
to the spread of the Wolof language. The secessionist movement in the
Casamance since 1981, organised by the Mouvement des Forces
De!mocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) and strongest among the
ethnic Diola, has not involved anti-Wolof linguistic mobilisation,
although the Wolof language could be seen as part of the resented
northern hegemony, spreading in the markets and the schoolyards of
Casamance as of the rest of Senegal, spreading even among the rural
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Diola as a result of very substantial migration to Dakar (young women,
notably, in domestic service). The emergence of the Halpulaaren
movement in the 1980s, defending the cause of the Pulaar language,
working to unite the ethnic Peul and Toucouleur behind the
Halpulaaren banner, on the other hand, is a possible indicator of a
more culturally conflictual future.
Languages of civilisation
If symbolic confrontation of languages has yet to develop between the
different indigenous or ‘national ’ languages of Senegal, a symbolic
issue has become manifest between some of the partisans of written
Wolof (in the Roman script) and the defenders of the continuing
monopoly of the French language in matters literate. University
people, of course, have been prominently involved here, first inspired
by the scholar-politician Cheikh Anta Diop, whose scholarly writings$(
argued the linguistic descent of Wolof (or, in his chosen orthography,
Valaf) from the hieroglyphs of ancient Egypt. His arguments have been
strongly contested (in France) on scholarly grounds (for example, how
could he ascribe vowel sounds to ancient Egyptian where the
established authorities remain baﬄed?) but those arguments were also
to be seen in a Senegalese political context. Cheikh Anta Diop had
more than a linguistic thesis, eccentric in the view of his French
academic critics, he had his own political parties in the 1960s (the Bloc
des Masses Se!ne! galaises, then the Rassemblement National
De!mocratique) and a political periodical, the Franco-Valaf Siggi, later
Taxaw. He blazed one kind of trail towards an eventual emergence of
a Wolof literature and science, and his Sorbonne thesis was for his
numerous followers the most glorious trophy of the Wolofisation cause.
He was the cantankerous Grand Old Man of Wolof literature,
demonstrating the possibility of a Communist Manifesto or of a Theory
of Relativity transcribed in Wolof, demonstrating most importantly
that what you could write in French you could write just as well in
Valaf.
The cause of literate Wolofisation was taken on in the early 1970s by
the younger Dakar intelligentsia, in a series of public meetings in and
around Dakar University (now the Universite! Cheikh Anta Diop). A
largely Wolof language periodical, Kaddu, was then edited by Ousmane
Sembe' ne, the novelist and cinema director, together with the university
$( Cheikh Anta Diop, Nations ne[ gres et culture (Paris, 1995 [1964]) ; L’Afrique noire preU coloniale
(Paris, 1960) ; L’AnteU rioriteU des civilisations ne[ gres. Mythe ou veU riteU historique? (Paris, 1967).
40 donal cruise o ’brien
linguist Pathe! Diagne. Enthusiasm for literate Wolof was at its height
in 1971, when this appeared (to its supporters) to be the logical cultural
complement to political independence from France. But attendance at
the public meetings in this cause soon began to dwindle. Kaddu went
out of circulation, and the Senegalese government mounted its cultural
counteroffensive. The government could rely on widespread (if, for a
time, also quiet) popular support, and not only among the French
educated; it could rely on much Senegalese reluctance to try to break
any cultural (or other) links with France.
As the Wolofisers in nationalist style denounced the government’s
continuing reliance on the colonial language, unworthy of African
independence, the government began its counterattack discreetly, with
negotiations over an agreed orthography in Wolof (‘Valaf ’ remained
an idiosyncrasy of Cheikh Anta Diop). The use of written Wolof in the
state educational system had to await an agreed orthography –
President Leopold Senghor used such tactics of delay together with a
discreet extension of government patronage, with Cheikh Anta Diop on
the payroll at the Institut Fondamental d’Afrique Noire. The president
had a particularly strong aversion to the cultural–political cause of
Wolofisation, an aversion both to the culture and to the politics. How
dared those young university upstarts try to tell a president who was
also an Agre! ge! en Grammaire the terms of civilisation? The advocates
of written Wolofisation for their part explained the president’s
resistance in terms of his non-Wolof (Serer) ethnic origin, his
indifferently spoken Wolof, and his fundamental commitment to the
French language and culture. Some of these culturalists scarcely
concealed their scorn,$) but they would have done well to remember
that their president was also a seasoned politician. Poorly spoken Wolof
might be ludicrous to them, but it was never an electoral liability for
Leopold Senghor: worth quite a few votes among the Serer,$* as well
as others of non-Wolof ethnicity, and it didn’t hurt much among the
Wolof, outside of the university. The most ardent advocates of written
Wolofisation were often those who had already been through the best
of French-language instruction, some of the more prominent of them
were French nationals : most Wolof speakers on the other hand wanted
to see more and better French-language instruction, as a passport to
occupational and geographical mobility for their children. Many no
doubt could see little benefit in being taught a language they already
$) When interviewed in Dakar over a period from January to April 1975.
$* Villalon, Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal, pp. 81–7.
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knew. Thus the president, who appeared to his Wolofising culturalist
opponents to be a hopelessly Frenchified figure, out of touch with the
national cultural reality of Senegal, was probably more attuned than
they to real popular demands in the politics of language.%!
Government legislation in any case was to follow President Senghor’s
cultural and political precepts, slowing down any movement towards
the introduction of Wolof in state education. The first step, in 1971, was
to give official recognition to the six ‘national languages ’ in Senegal :
Wolof, Serer, Pulaar, Mandinka, Diola, Soninke. There was no
indication of any legislative effect of this ‘ recognition’, but an
important symbolic point was made: six languages, no suggestion of
ranking, the Wolof were reminded that they were neither alone nor
recognised as pre-eminent. Decrees followed in 1975 establishing an
agreed orthography for Wolof and Serer,%" but the introduction of
Wolof to the state school system was then held up by an officially
declared need to maintain equity with the other national languages. Of
those six languages, however, only Wolof has been the subject of the
sort of documentary study (dictionary, grammar, manuals) which
could have provided a basis for written schoolwork. The Wolof
language had been studied by French scholars for a century and a half,
by Senegalese scholars especially since independence, the most
extensive recent work being that of the Centre de Linguistique
Applique! e de Dakar towards a complete Wolof–French dictionary with
a series of accompanying manuels peUdagogiques.%# Leopold Senghor,
whose views on the national language issue have strongly influenced
the policies of his presidential successor, Abdou Diouf, however
relegated all African languages to the status of langues d’intuition, at some
distance below the langue de raisonnement, French.
Civilisation, in the presidential view, was a word best written in
French, and the officially recognised languages were thus ‘recognised’
the more effectively to be ignored in the educational process. There are,
however, political questions at issue here, together with those of
cultural status, and the presidential perspective in matters of culture
had its less than fully explicated political logic. The pedagogic benefits
of learning to read and write in a language one knew well, rather than
%! For an excellent biography see J. Vaillant, Black, French and African. A biography of Leopold
Sedar Senghor (Cambridge, MA, 1990).
%" De! cret assurant le de! coupage des mots en Serer et en Wolof, nos. 75-1025}6 in Journal
Officiel de la ReUpublique du SeUneUgal, 8 Nov. 1975.
%# See A. Fall, R. Santos and J. Doneux, Dictionnaire Wolof–Français, suivi d’un Index Français–
Wolof (Paris, 1990) p. 336), also J. L. Diouf and M. Yaguello, J’apprends le Wolof (Paris, 1991) (a
manual for school use).
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in the often unfamiliar French, might be accepted, but what would be
the likely political consequences if the state were to accord the Wolof
language an official priority through the educational system? There
remains a clear potential here for a para-politics of primordialism,
starting perhaps with some organised reaction on the part of those the
Wolof call lakakat. Those barbarians might not accept the argument of
the educationalists, that their languages were inadequately docu-
mented for use in formal education, they might refuse in any case to
accept such an argument as a pretext for imposing Wolof-language
state instruction. And although Wolof is very widely spoken in Senegal,
it is little used beyond the state’s borders, while two other Senegalese
languages (Pulaar and Mandinka) are widely used in neighbouring
West African states : an eventual possibility then of the language issue
feeding into secessionist or irredentist politics. Any attempt to impose
Wolof in school in the southern region of Casamance, some of it a war
zone since 1981, would have an immediate effect in aggravating an
already fraught cultural situation, prolonging the war.%$
The more euphoric Wolofisers in their heyday simply dismissed such
considerations from their minds, or saw them as part of a necessary
progress. One French university professor, with strong sympathies for
the cause of Wolof-language instruction, thus remarked to a Dakar
audience that ‘History is full of linguistic assassinations.’ That remark
(in 1967) provoked at least one troubled reply, ‘ there are some
languages that do not want to die ’.%% Government policy since that
time has suggested a sense of the dangers which failed to disturb the
French sociologist. Official discourses commonly express the hope that
the national languages will in the future be more used in the
educational process, and publicity is given to such experimental use of
written Wolof as has already been made. At the same time, however,
literate Wolofisation has remained subject to some close supervision
and official control. Government decrees in 1977 thus reaffirmed the
requirement for conformity with the Wolof (and Serer) orthography
established two years before, also stipulating serious judicial penalties
for those who transgressed. Three months in jail, or a fine of up to 1
million francs CFA (then worth £16,000), were to be imposed for
anyone publishing Wolof texts which included, for example, double
%$ See D. Darbon, ‘Le culturalisme Bas-Casamançais ’, in Politique Africaine 14 (June 1983),
125–8 ; also O. Linaires, Power, Prayer and Production. The Jola of Casamance, Senegal (Cambridge,
1992).
%% P. Fougeyrollas, ‘L’Enseignement du Français au Service de la Nation Se!ne! galaise ’ (Dakar :
Centre de Linguistique Applique! e de Dakar, 1967), p. 32.
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consonants.%& The principal titles of the Wolofisers’ press (Sembene’s
Kaddu, Cheikh Anta Diop’s Siggi) flaunted that double consonant:
although the editors never went to jail on that account, the titles soon
went out of print. Those 1977 decrees might be seen as a last wave of
the schoolmaster’s cane from Leopold Senghor before his retirement
from the presidency in 1980. Abdou Diouf as presidential successor was
soon to identify himself with a relative political liberalisation in
allowing (April 1981) a more open multiparty competition, but he has
remained consistently faithful to the language policies of his pre-
decessor.
In the altered circumstances of the 1980s, with some of the
formalities of a multiparty democratic transition, against a background
of economic decline, it was at the same time remarkable that the
demand for literate Wolofisation was also reduced. Impasse in the field
of language literacy left language politics still in the shadows, Wolof
was thus denied its recognition, this at the same time as the progress of
Urban Wolof as a spoken language has continued and even been
accelerated with the urbanisation of Senegal’s population. One
politician in particular, Abdoulaye Wade of the Parti De!mocratique
Se!ne! galais, has successfully used Urban Wolof as part of his opposition
campaign, while President Diouf (like Wade, ethnically Wolof) is more
at ease, when speaking officially, in French. Swigart, observing the
1988 elections from a linguistic standpoint, remarked that while most
candidates tried to speak as ‘pure’ a language as possible,
there was…one exception to this pure language pattern and that was in the
speeches of Abdoulaye Wade. I watched and heard how he unhesitatingly
switched from French to Wolof and back, intermingling single lexical items
and phrases of the two languages in the Urban Wolof manner…Whatever lay
behind his language choice, his supporters loved him. As he mixed French and
Wolof the young people surrounding him cheered and applauded.%'
When she interviewed him, however, Professor Wade flatly stated that
‘ in my campaign speeches I used either one language or the other. It
is preferable to speak either pure French or pure Wolof.’%( The
professor thus denies the disreputable language mixing which the
politician so successfully practises.
%& Loi de la ReUpublique du SeUneUgal, no. 77–55, 10 Apr. 1977, providing also for double penalties
in case of a second offence.
%' Swigart, ‘Cultural Creolisation and language use ’, p. 184. The prophesy of the linguist F.
Wioland is relevant : ‘Dakar Wolof has an irresistible socio-linguistic dynamic, it will come to
dominate all of Senegal, as Parisian French has done through the ages.’ F. Wioland, ‘Enque# te sur
les langues parle! es au Se!ne! gal par les e! le' ves de l’enseignement primaire…’, p. 5.
%( Swigart, ‘Cultural Creolisation and language use ’, p. 185.
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Urban Wolof is in more general terms not only a language, as
Swigart remarks, it is a new identity, remarkable among other reasons
for being seen as a composite of essentially negative attributes%) –
smooth talkers, sly, disrespectful, quick to take insult, dishonest – and
is seen in these terms by the Wolof themselves. This is the ‘modern’
language of Senegal, the language of those who get on, the language of
success. And around this emerging language, with its formidable power
of attraction (and, in effect, incorporation) one sees the emergence of
a Senegalese political culture, be it one of which nobody seems to be
particularly proud.
: : :
The fact that French still rules as official language of state, in all
documentation as well as in the training and selection of officialdom, in
education from the primary level upwards, is probably the most
important explanation for the relative absence of conflict between
different language groups in Senegal. This is a linguistic situation to be
placed in its African context, part of a post-colonial pattern, as argued
by M. N. Ngalasso and A. Ricard in 1986.%* The linguistic logic of the
post-colony is that the primary language of state is different from the
languages of society. Such is the general African pattern: there have
been some attempts to use a local language in place of that of colonial
inheritance as the dominant language of state, but these have tended
to raise problems both of status and power between language groups.
The post-colonial language inheritance thus raises some quite fun-
damental questions, questions of the survival of the state in con-
temporary Africa.
Some examples may be instructive here, beginning with that of the
Zaı$ rian government which sought to impose Lingala as chosen
language of authenticity, meeting determined resistance from the
partisans of other languages. This was remarked by Young and Turner
with particular reference to a Congress of Zaı$ rian Linguists in 1975,
when the government’s linguistic contingent ‘had to retreat in the face
of strong opposition from the Shaba and Kasai delegates ’.&! David
Laitin in 1990 remarked of Zaı$ re that ‘despite fifteen years of seeking
to implement an ‘‘authentic ’’ language regime, the status of French is
rising, if anything’.&" Similarly in Central Africa, although Sango was
%) Swigart, ‘Practice and perception’, p. 106.
%* M. N. Ngallaso and A. Ricard, ‘Des langues et des e! tats ’, Politique Africaine 23 (1986).
&! C. Young and T. Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State (Madison, WI, 1985),
p. 155. &" Laitin, Language Repertoires and State Construction in Africa, p. 127.
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declared the national language in 1964, French still prevails in
practice : in Co# te d’Ivoire the first article of the constitution stipulates
that ‘ la langue officielle est le français ’. Nor are such post-colonial
linguistic phenomena peculiar to la francophonie. Even in Tanzania,
where nine-tenths of the population speaks Swahili, and where the
government declared Swahili the national language in 1964, using the
language in all schools, it ‘ is facing popular pressure from students to
provide secondary education in the English language’, and has
retreated on that issue.&# The Ugandan Constitutional Conference of
1993, after reviewing the claims of Luganda and Swahili for recognition
as the country’s national language, preferred not to ‘revive old debates ’
(around the Buganda issue, most explosively) and thus to retain the
relatively uncontroversial English as language of state.&$
The French language and cultural presence in Senegal thus fits into
a post-colonial African pattern. The particularity of this case lies partly
in its historical depth, more than a century and a half, partly in the
consistency with which it has been promoted by African political
leadership, from the years (1914–34) when Blaise Diagne represented
Senegal in the French National Assembly, through the long hegemony
of Leopold Senghor (1951–80) and the presidency of Abdou Diouf
(1981– ). The tide of French influence may now, however, be running
out, a retreat viewed in Senegal with disquiet and occasional derision,
as when the satirical Le Politicien calls French ‘a moribund language’.&%
Hoots of derision for la francophonie, it has been argued here, may not
quite fit the interests of the partisans of the Wolof cause. A paradox
may be involved, and it is surely possible that Wolofisers in the future
may look back on the role of the state’s present leadership with
nostalgia. That leadership’s obdurate refusal to abandon their
insistence on French language and culture (in writing) has created a
political climate within which the (spoken) Wolof language and culture
have expanded with remarkably little opposition, to a point where they
are in an increasingly clear priority position within Senegalese society.
This is the expansion not only of a language, Urban Wolof, but also,
at one remove, of an ethnic group, an ethnic group in expansion and
mutation, the possible core ethnie of a future Senegalese nation.
French, in the meantime, still works not only to secure the Senegalese
state but also to preserve the privileges of a Senegalese e! lite. As
&# Ibid., p. 140.
&$ H. B. Hansen and M. Twaddle, ‘Uganda: the advent of no-party democracy’, in J. A.
Wiseman (ed.), Democracy and Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa (London and New York, 1995),
pp. 145–6. &% Cited in Swigart, ‘Cultural Creolisation and language use ’, p. 179.
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Leonardo Villalon remarks, drawing on his experience of the
bureaucracy of Fatick, ‘ literacy and the use of the French language, in
a country where only a small percentage of the population can do so,
serve as an exclusionary barrier that precludes much societal intrusion
into the state’s domain’.&& True enough, and closely observed, but one
may perhaps also discern some mass support for this remote language
of the e! lite. Among the non-Wolof ethnic communities in Senegal, and
especially among the barbarian lakakat who insist on speaking their
own languages, French cultural domination is a much less immediate
threat than would be involved in a Wolof literacy campaign, imposed
by the state.
For the moment, however, in the absence of any such unwelcome
state initiative, Wolofisation in Senegal remains in the zone of shadow
politics, an undirected social movement indicating a possible language
future for the state. Cheikh Anta Diop, the political leader who tried
hardest to give some direction to this process, who was most determined
in his effort to take Wolof out of the shadows, failed comprehensively
in his campaign for Wolof literacy. His stance may be compared with
that of Abdoulaye Wade, the political leader who denies that he is
speaking Urban Wolof, while speaking it (perhaps only half-
consciously) like a virtuoso. Wade has been the most successful orator
of modern Senegal : he could be the hero of the Dakar crowds (at least
at the time of the 1988 elections) without taking any interest in the
cause of Wolof literacy. His oratorical medium, the hybrid Urban
Wolof, has been an important part of his populist message: ‘ for all my
university degrees, my career as lawyer and professor, I am one of you’.
Abdoulaye Wade may not concern himself with linguistics, but he
seems to know the rules of shadow politics. More than any other
Senegalese politician he certainly knew how to draw a crowd: the
individuals in that crowd have been making their own language
choices, choices which have implications for an emerging political
identity. A nation may thus be built not by high directives of state,
imposed from above, but by a process of linguistic hybridisation, by
only partly conscious popular choices, made for the most part in the
shadows.
&& Villalon, Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal, p. 83.
